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BOOK REVIEW EXCHANGE
LAW, LITERATURE, AND THE CELEBRATION
OF AUTHORITY
Robin West*

INTRODUCTION

Richard Posner's new book, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood
Relation,' is a defense of "liberal legalism" against a group of modem
critics who have only one thing in common: their use of either particular
pieces of literature or literary theory to mount legal critiques. 2 Perhaps
for that reason, it is very hard to discern a unified thesis within Posner's
book regarding the relationship between law and literature. In part, Posner is complaining about a pollution of literature by its use and abuse in
political and legal argument; thus, the "misunderstood relation" to
which the title refers. At times, Posner suggests that this is the major
thesis of the book-he simply wants to rescue literature from its misuse
by critics of legalism. 3 By the end of the book, however, it is clear that
Posner has no real passion for his claim that great literature is never
really about law, that it is always about more exalted things, and that its
use in legal or political arguments therefore is improper. Rather, Posner's real concern is the celebration and vindication of liberal legalism,
and he is as happy using literature to celebrate liberal legalism as are its
critics in making their attack.
I will argue that Law and Literature ought to be read primarily as
an impressionistic and impassioned celebration of legalism-liberal or
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Visiting Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy,
and Public Policy, College Park, Maryland. I would like to thank Lynne Henderson, Cass Sunstein,
Richard Posner, Mark SagofF, Robert Green, and Tom Grey for comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
I R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) [hereinafter R.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE].

2 See, eg., S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF
THE WORD (1984); West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and

Political Visions of Franz Kafka and RichardPosner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); see also Fish,
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV.1325 (1984); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationand the
Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 554 (1982).
3 R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 13-31, 209-11.
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conservative-and that the book contributes little to an understanding of
either the works of literature or the legal and literary theories which it
discusses. Although Posner's interpretations of pieces of literature that
deal with legal themes are sometimes surprising and often interesting,
those interpretations are transparently dependent on his main agenda,
which is a spirited celebration of legalist virtues. Posner's book nevertheless should be of great interest to professional and academic legal audiences. It tells us something important about the distinguishing
commitments of liberal legalism and the type of personality which it attracts. That alone, and entirely apart from the merits or demerits of the
literary interpretations Posner presents, makes the book's celebration of
legalism of great interest.
More specifically, I will argue that the "liberal legalism" celebrated
and passionately defended in Law and Literature rests on two essentially
conservative convictions: (1) that our present law is, for the most part, as
it should be, and (2) that our present law is, for the most part, as it must
be. Legal authority, as it is presently constituted, Posner teaches, is generally both necessary and desirable;neither can we, nor should we, make
fundamental changes in our law. Indeed, the book's impassioned celebrations of legal authority and of what Posner calls the "morality of obedience ' 4 to legal authority well illustrate the Critical Legal Studies
movement's central and most controversial claim about liberal legal orthodoxy: that it is an essentially conservative and "Panglossian" faith in
the virtue and necessity of existing authority-including, but not limited
to, legal authority-that motivates as well as defines liberal legalist
thought. The lasting importance of Law and Literature may turn out to
be that its celebratory and conservative endorsement of authority unwittingly proves at least this aspect of the critics' case.
I will also argue in this review that Law and Literature tells us
something important about what motivates liberal legalism and what
kind of personality is attached to it. It is often assumed, at least in the
Critical Legal Studies movement, that the "Panglossian attitude" unique
to liberal legalism-the distinctive faith in the virtue and necessity of
legal authority-is motivated by "sentimentality," and, more specifically,
by a sentimental view of the relation between our ideals and our law.
According to the critics, this sentimentality is reflected in a paradigmatic
type of argument, which I will call the "sentimental argument," in liberal
legalist discourse. 5 Thus, liberal legal arguments, according to their critics, typically begin with some independent value or moral ideal, such as
efficiency, 6 procedural fairness, 7 or legal equality, 8 as the first premise.
4 Id. at 252.

5 See,
6 See,
7 See,
8 See,

e.g., M. KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
e.g., H.L.A. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958).
e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
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They then make an apparently historical-but, in fact, sentimentalclaim that our present law perfectly or approximately actualizes that
ideal: the common law is efficient, 9 our present procedures are fair, 10 or
our Constitution does guarantee equality. 1 The liberal legalist then
draws the "Panglossian" and comforting conclusion that our present law
is as it more or less ought to be.
It is true that many liberal legalist arguments do fit precisely this
sentimental form. Let me illustrate with two examples. First, Ronald
Dworkin's early and extremely clever argument that the United States
Constitution simply does contain an analogue for every possible good
faith moral claim about government, such that a sincere civil disobedient
always has a viable constitutionalas well as moral argument (and therefore really is not a law-breaker), 12 rests quite explicitly on this sort of
sentimental vision of our constitutional history. 13 Because of an extraordinary convergence of luck, bravery, and wisdom, the Constitution,
at least when "properly" read, converges perfectly with a moral scheme
of foundational law. Similarly, the legal economists' early arguments
that common law rules of contract and property are efficient rested on
sentimental claims about our common law history. Efficiency is to the
economists what equality and justice are to Dworkin. The implicit sentimental premise of the economists' arguments was that, through an extraordinary combination of luck, wisdom or foresight, common law
judges semimiraculously hit upon efficient solutions to legal issues. Thus,
these two liberal legal arguments, despite their widely divergent moral
ideals and political orientations, share the same logical structure. Both
begin with a particular ideal (equality; efficiency) and then make the further sentimental claim that our present law (constitutional; common),
when properly understood, embodies that ideal. It is that logical structure which I call "sentimental."
Using Law and Literature as evidence, I will argue in this review
that, while modern liberal legalism-the faith that legal authority is as it
ought and must be-does indeed frequently rest on a sentimental view of
legal authority, liberal legalist arguments also often rest on an altogether
different and decidedly non-sentimental world-view, which liberal legalist
literature has not well articulated and which critical legal scholars have
not well critiqued. Indeed, this second world-view has been somewhat
suppressed and supports a very different type of liberal-legalist argument
than those summarized above. This second sort of argument-which I
9 For a critical appraisal, see Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
10 For a critique, see M. KELMAN, supra note 5.
11 FREEMAN, Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
12 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).

13 See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 9.

HeinOnline -- 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 979 1988-1989

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

will call the "authoritarian argument"--contends that our law approaches the ideal, not because legal authority miraculously converges
with some moral ideal, but because the contingent legal authorities in our
world-the "authors" of our law-authoritatively dictate what our
moral ideals are to be. Our law is morally perfect, not because it miraculously converges with our ideals, but because our legal authorities mandate the content of our moral ideals as well as the content of our legal
obligations.
Although it may appear to be only an unimportant or semantic
distinction, there is a world of difference between the sentimental and
authoritarian arguments and their motivating world-views. The authoritarian argument for the perfection of law rests, not on the apparently
historicalbut essentiallysentimental claim that our presently constituted
legal rules happen to map onto some stated ethical ideal, but on the apparently descriptive but essentially authoritarianclaim that whatever attributes our presently constituted legal rules happen to exhibit are
therefore moral ideals. Legal authority dictates, in effect, what our moral
truths and ideals are to be. It determines the ideals to which we pledge
our allegiance and will devote our energies. Whether legitimate or illegitimate, legal authority dictates our collective moral ideals and our individual moral worth as well as our individual and collective fate. It
dictates what we should be as well as what we will be.
Whatever world-view grounds this authoritarian argument, it most
assuredly is not sentimentalism. To the extent that the authoritarian argument underlies liberal legalism, it is therefore a mistake to identify liberal legalist ideology with a sentimental urge to see the world through
rose-colored glasses. Rather, what finds expression in this second argument that law is good because law defines the good is not sentimentality
but a cluster of authoritarian commitments: a nihilistic embrace of the
authority of the powerful; a resigned admission that might makes right; a
deterministic and Calvinist acquiescence in the "givenness" of authority,
even where that authority turns out to be entirely arbitrary; a steadfast
certainty that our individual moral worth is to be judged as well as determined by arbitrary, but powerful, pregiven authorities; and an uncritical
embrace of "the order of things" imposed by the dominant but largely
invisible legal, political, cultural, and epistemological actors of our past.
The emotional need expressed by this second argument for liberal legalism-and the need which, I will argue, Posner's book makes fairly explicit-is not the sentimental need to see actual authority as perfectly
congruent with our moral ideals; rather, it is the need to constrain the
individual will by an external authority. If Posner's account of liberal
legalism is at all representative, then the appeal of liberal legalism may be
that it gives voice to the deep and human need to identify the individual's
will, worth, power, and fate with the judgment of a higher, nonnatural,
or simply "other" authority. If so, then liberal legalism may continue to
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resonate in the law school culture despite the barrage of debunking criticism directed against it, because it is the only ideology to do so.
Thus, the underexamined and undercriticized argument for liberal
legalism revealed in Law and Literature is that we should respect and
obey given authority, not because that authority is or is perceived to be
good, but because it is good to subordinate one's individual will to the
dictates of a powerful, nonnatural, impersonal authority. The claim that
impersonal, external, nonnatural authority has intrinsic value independent of its content is hardly new. Nor is the need that it satisfies unique to
liberal legalism. For many in our culture, the need to subordinate one's
self to an impersonal, nonnatural, and external source of power and
moral judgment is met through allegiance to some sort of Judaic or
Christian God. For those who cannot or choose not to make the leap of
faith, that source of power and external judgment instead might be found
in the nonnatural will and normative influence of institutional, cultural,
historical authorities. For the economic legalist, for example, economic
markets may fill precisely this need for binding, normative authority:
markets, like gods, are powerful, impersonal, ultimately arbitrary, external, and nonnatural authorities which simultaneously determine an individual's fate as well as judge his moral worth. For the liberal legalist,
however, it is the Rule of Law, particular laws, legal systems, or legal
institutions, rather than markets or gods, that fill the same authoritative
need. Thus, the mandates of institutional legal authority to the liberal
legalist, like the commands of God to the Calvinist and like market-dictated choices to some normative legal economists, are good and are to be
obeyed, not because they are perceived to be just or are possessive of any
particular virtue, but solely because they are authoritative.
This review has four parts. Part One explores the celebration of
authority, both legal and otherwise, within Law and Literature and argues that this celebration is rooted in a fear of nature and thirst for the
certainty of external judgment. Part Two shows how these authoritarian
commitments color Posner's readings of literature. Part Three criticizes
Posner's arguments for the necessity and desirability of authority and the
world-view upon which they rest. The Conclusion speculates very briefly
on the possibility of an alternative feminist world-view.

I.

THE CELEBRATION OF AUTHORITY

Posner celebrates the virtue and necessity of authority in all spheres
of life, not just the narrowly legal. In many spheres of life, he suggests,
authority is both good and necessary; the "good life" thus is the obedient
life. The particular authorities Posner celebrates in Law and Literature
include not only such obvious candidates as "law," the "founding fathers," military orders, and military commanders, but also more subtle
authorities in our lives: the epistemological "authority" implied by the
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meaning of words; 14 the legal authority of criminal law and tort law as
normative restrictions on our will;15 the political authority of the state of
Virginia to restrict the irrational reproductivity of the mentally retarded
(which was endorsed by the authoritative voice of Justice Holmes in
17
Buck v. Bell);16 the sociobiological authority of evolution over our fate;
the celestial authority of organized religion over our souls;' 8 the cultural
authority of the "classics" over our definitions of aesthetic value; 19 and
the "civilized" authority of Apollonian and Christian values over our
otherwise mutinous, Dionysian, and pagan subjectivity. 20 Similarly, Posner criticizes all that throws the virtue of authority into doubt. Here, the
list is much longer. It includes such diverse critics of unbending conformity as Rousseau's politics, 2 1 romantic literature, 22 modern critics of
legalism 23 (particularly the Critical Legal Studies movement 24), the idealism of youth, 25 collective political activity, 26 Dionysian values, 27 both
radical individualism and communitarianism, 28 the attempts to live our
dreams, 29 the dreams themselves, 30 the deconstruction movement, 31 any
philosophical movement that insists upon the necessity of choice,32 Albert Camus' celebrated novel The Stranger,33 the "morality of rebellion"
and those who endorse it, 34 Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudential suggestion
that judges ought to freely interpret the law so as to give it the best normative meaning possible, 35 and
the application of all the major tenets of
"new criticism" to judging. 36
When we are young, Posner explains, we do not always understand
the value of authority and the virtue of relentless and near-unbending
14 R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 209-17.

15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

151-55.
164-65.
25-29, 141, 164-65.
137-40.

19 Id. at 71-75.
20 Id. at 148-51.
21 Id. at 145.

22 Id. at 137-55.
23 Id. at 132-205.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 176-205, 211-20.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 69, 150, 202-05.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 211-20.
See, e.g., id. at 86-90, 98, 145, 151-55, 169, 217, 227-28, 258-59, 261.
See id. at 86-90, 98, 151, 169.

34 Id. at 145-55.

35 Id. at 217-19.
36 Id. at 220-47.
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37
obedience to it.
We foolishly feel that our individual political will and

collective political options are limitless and that our given "civilization"
is both malleable and flawed. We naively think that, through our actions, we can make a better social world.38 We are wrong on both
counts. As we age, most of us come to understand both the futility and
the impracticability of our youthful romantic dreams of a better society.
Maturity, an unequivocal good for Posner, simply is the process of coming to grips with the "unpleasant truth" that we cannot really change
things for the better and the much more pleasant truth that we do not
really need to: that civilization-presently-constituted institutional,
political, culttral, and epistemological authority-mostly is as it must
and ought to be. We are not born with this wisdom, though, because,
unluckily for us, man is the animal for whom it is the case that "the act,"
39
unlike the imagination, is a "slave to the limit."1
As we mature, we

learn to relinquish our naive idealism and acknowledge the desirability
and necessity of this authority. Finally, we learn to appreciate the limits
of our power to change our political, social, cultural, and linguistic world
for the better. Thus, the key to the good life, Posner argues, is discipline
and a mature obedience-hence
Posner's endorsement of what he calls a
"morality of obedience." 4 The individual should resign himself to the
limits of individual action, the futility of collective politics, and the impossibility of social change. The individual must be disciplined to accept
the constraints of pregiven authority. He must learn to obey the mandates of those who are more powerful than he, and as he matures, should
learn to do so cheerfully.
"Romanticism" is Posner's label for the mistaken assumption,
forgivably common among the young, and less forgivably recurrent in a
strand of low-quality-because immature-literature and philosophy,
that human nature is potentially and naturally good, or even redeemable,
and that it is societal authority which is corrupting. 4 1 Contrary to the
teachings of romantic literature, romantic philosophy, and the false
hopes of the young, our human nature is neither inherently good nor
malleable. Rather, Posner explains, we are essentially, naturally, and unchangeably vengeful. 42 We are, by nature, inclined to irrational violence. 43 In a word, we are "fallen." 44 Romantic beliefs to the contrary
not only lead to dangerous radicalism and naive utopianism, but also
pose the twin dangers of excessive individualism and excessive communitarianism: romanticism simultaneously posits a limitless, naturally trust37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

67, 98, 140-41, 145.
67-68.
67.
252.
145-51.
25-70.

43 Id.

44 Id. at 164.
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worthy individual will, 4 5 while, at the same time, threatens the
"boundaries between individuals" by positing a limitless and naturally
trustworthy human community. 46 The romantic dangerously trumpets a
return to nature, 47 the triumph of pagan over Christian values,4 8 and the
victory of Dionysian over Apollonian virtues in the false hope of achieving utopia.4 9 Should this campaign succeed, Posner claims, the result
will be holocaust, not utopia.50 The romantic's heedless, reckless quest
for the ideal will usher in the death of law-which Posner characterizes
repeatedly as the "bastion of Apollonian values" 5 1 and the "symbol of
civilized values" 52-the ruination of civilization, the specter of mutiny, a
reversion to a social order premised upon endless cycles of revenge, and
an unleashing of man's barbaric, hostile, and vengeful instincts, and not,
as he naively believes, the good, the communitarian, the individualistic,
or the free.
Let me give six examples of Posner's celebration of the necessity and
desirability of authority, each drawn from a different sphere of life,
before discussing the commitments on which that celebration seems to
depend. First, and perhaps most strikingly, particularly to the nonlegal
audience, is Posner's celebration of what might be called "institutional
authority"-which Posner calls "civilization"-and his severe chastisement of all who would question or change it in any sort of fundamental
way. Civilization, at least in its present democratic form, constitutes the
orderly antithesis of a fallen, irrational, evil, and random human nature. 53 It is therefore desirable.5 4 Civilization is also necessary: the institutions that comprise our civilization are mostly unchangeable. 55
Dreams of better institutions thus are futile-you can't, after all, really
change anything-and to act on our dreams is even worse; when we were
56
to act on such dreams, we quickly would see them become nightmares.
With only rare exceptions (such as Nazi Germany) the individual ought
therefore to embrace a "morality of obedience" 57 rather than a "morality
of rebellion" with respect to the institutional authority in our lives: Each
of us ought to appreciate the value of our civilization, our institutional
authority, and come to grips with our inability to improve it.
45 Id. at 150-51.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 145.

48 Id. at 144-51.
49 Id. at 149-50.

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

144-51.
16, 155, 307.
90.
25-40.
25-70.
67-68, 74-75.
69.
252.
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Second, Posner celebrates what might be called "hierarchical authority." Authority firmly embedded in "hierarchy" shares the necessity
and desirability of authority firmly embedded in civilized institutions.
Hierarchical authority is as it must and should be: orders from on high
cannot be challenged, and those orders generally are good. The individual in a hierarchy is both powerful and, in turn, obedient. He orders
others but also obeys the authority of others. The military hierarchy perfectly embodies this dual ethic of authority and obedience; Posner accordingly praises military virtues58 and uses the military hierarchy as a
metaphor for virtue in other spheres of hierarchical personalized authority, such as judging. 59 The good commander commands obedience and is
himself obedient, just as the good judge commands obedience and obeys
the legal mandates of higher legal authorities. In a perfect hierarchy,
every actor is both obedient and authoritative. Power is personally exercised, but it is always exercised pursuant to still higher authority. At no
point can or should hierarchical authority be challenged.
Third, Posner celebrates "cultural authority." His argument here
for the virtue of authority is most explicit. The criterion by which we
should judge a piece of art, Posner argues, is its survival over time in the
institutionalized cultural marketplace. 60 A piece of writing has aesthetic
value-it is a "classic"-if it survives across time and becomes encased in
institutional culture. "Classics," in turn, authoritatively define aesthetic
value: 6 1 if a piece of literature has survived, then it is great. Aesthetic
value thus is a function of what survives in a Darwinian cultural battle of
the fittest. Aesthetic value is not "up for grabs," so to speak. It is not up
to us to decide what we value in art or why. Our assessments of artistic
value must be disciplined to the authority of our classics. If Hamlet is a
classic-if it has survived-then we learn from Hamlet what is and isn't
of aesthetic value. Consequently, in culture, as in institutions and the
military, authority turns out to be invariably "desirable." Classics are,
by definition, great. What we ought to do, then, is discipline our aesthetic judgment to the mandates of history. We should value whatever
attributes classics exhibit and should resign ourselves to the futility of
active aesthetic judgment.
Fourth, Posner impliedly argues that a widely shared and longstanding ethical convention also becomes authoritative, and thereby acquires normative force as well as institutional power. Posner does not
argue the point explicitly, but it is implicit in much of what he says about
literature. In his interpretation of Merchantof Venice, for example, Posner accepts without argument the moralistic premise that a loan contract
which uses a pound of flesh as collateral is morally abhorrent and, there58 Id. at 161.

59 Id. at 252-53.
60 Id. at 71-76.
61 Id.
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fore, unenforceable. 62 Posner sees no need to argue that such an agreement is indeed immoral even if both contractors clearly desire to make it.
The fact that the conventional belief that it is immoral is both widely
shared and has been widely sharedfor a long time apparently is sufficient
to establish that the conventional belief is also correct. The convention
has survived, so it must be right. Historical conventions of what is right
63
and wrong thus authoritatively govern our morals and values.
Fifth, and perhaps of greatest importance to his ultimate views on
law, Posner celebrates what might be called "epistemological authority;"
the authoritative meanings which words, especially legal words, acquire
through their use and survival over a long period of time. Survival over
time confers authority, and authority confers a "correctness" to the
meanings of words which we are powerless to change. All users of language, but particularly judges and lawyers, must obey the meanings of
words laid down. The judicial interpreter of texts, Posner argues, is like
a field officer; the textual word is a command from his superior. 64 The
judge, like the officer, must exercise intelligence and judgment-but not
creativity-in understanding the command. Once understanding is
achieved, however, his obligation is clear: he must obey. The judicial
interpreter must and should obey the meaning of the word, just as the
officer both must and should obey his superior. Obedience to the authoritative meanings of words laid down is a linguistic imperative. The interpreter is not to participate in the construction of legal meaning.
In a lengthy chapter on the interpretation debate, 65 Posner accordingly rejects both Ronald Dworkin's claim that judges should participate
in the creation of the meanings of those texts 66 and the deconstructionists' claim that such participation is inevitable. 67 Posner's argument is
political and philosophical. First, Posner tells us that a judge's obedience
to the meaning of words and his resulting "subordinate status" are "conditions of judicial legitimacy."' 68 The judge is an "interpreter" of others'
commands. The legitimacy of his exercise of the power of government
depends upon his willingness to obey these commands. The "others"
giving the commands are, at various times, the framers of the constitution, 69 the legislature, 70 and such relatively disembodied "texts" as contracts or prior case law. 71 In all cases Posner maintains that the judge's
task is interpretive: he must ascertain the meaning of the given impera62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 93-106.
at
at
at
at
at

253.
209-68.
217-19, 227-28, 258-59, 261.
211-20.
245.

70 Id. at 240.
71 Id. at 246-47, 251.
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tive and then obey it. Like the military officer, the judge's morality is
essentially the "morality of obedience:" 72 The judge is like the officer on
the field who first must understand so that he then may act on the commands of his superiors. The responsible judicial exercise of power depends upon judicial obedience to the commands of higher authority.
Even more fundamentally, Posner suggests that legal actors must
obey the authoritative meanings of the words laid down. The result of
linguistic disobedience-of deconstructing "given meanings" to illuminate the choices upon which they rest-would be chaos. 73 Legal actors
cannot choose the meanings we ascribe to laws any more than we can
"choose" our code of ethics or criteria of artistic excellence. Our culturally constructed language consists of a cluster of meanings which are
authoritative "givens" to be obeyed. Texts, words, and sentences all have
meanings, and the listener's role, at least in the legal culture, is to understand and obey them, not create them. Thus, it is not just the "commands" of legislators, framers, or political communities that must be
obeyed, but also the "command" implicit in the meanings of legal words
themselves.
Finally, Posner celebrates legal authority. Although law is positive-it is manmade, not natural-it is fundamentally unchanging and
fundamentally good. As Posner tells us again and again, it is the "bastion of Apollonian values." 74 Law is both necessary and necessarily desirable. Unlike tool-making (which also is manmade), Posner explains,
law does not change significantly from time period to time period, nor
should it. Not just the "rule of law" or the "idea of law," but the broad
features of the laws themselves, are, for the most part, as they always have
been. Thus, law, like the meanings of words, literary classics, our ethical
commitments, and civilization itself, is a part of the culturally contingent
but nevertheless necessary and relatively unchanging pregiven authoritative world. 75 The "idea of law" and the particular laws themselves are
"things" that have been culturally created and have historically survived.
Like other such things, they have become "authoritative." Like other
authorities, they exhibit virtue; and, like all other virtuous authorities,
they should be obeyed.
Thus, in all spheres of life-institutional, hierarchical, cultural,
moral, linguistic, and legal-Posner first finds authority in the brute fact
of survival, and then finds moral or normative significance in the brute
fact of authority. If a work of art survives long enough, it is a "classic"
and therefore must have aesthetic value. 76 If a moral convention is
widely shared over a long period of time, it must be authoritative and,
72 Id. at
73 Id. at
74 Id. at
75 Id. at
76 Id. at

245, 252-53.
215, 242, 249.
155. See generally id. at 137-55.
74-76.
70-75.
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therefore, right. 77 If a legal word acquires a certain meaning, that authoritative meaning must align with the intention of its authors and not
the linguistic convention of its hearers. 7 8 If a political practice survives,
79
it thereby has become an authoritative tradition and, thus, is justified.
Finally, if a legal regime survives, it too acquires authority and therefore
is worthy of allegiance. 80 Pregiven, manmade, cultural, linguistic, institutional, hierarchical, and legal authorities simply have meaning, truth,
justice, and moral force. That which survives has authority and thereby
defines value and directs our will. The right action for the subordinate
individual in all of these spheres of life is to obey the mandates of that
pregiven authority. Our social, political, legal, epistemological, and ethical authorities are mostly as they ought to be.
What lies behind this relentlessly celebratory view of authority?
One possible explanation for this phenomenal faith in the convergence of
the ideal and the actual is that Posner insists upon the morality of given
authorities because he sentimentalizes their virtues. This explanation
aligns with the increasingly standard view in the CLS literature regarding the "Panglossian" and sentimental core of liberal legal thought. By
this account Posner identifies aesthetic value with aesthetic survival because he believes that it just so happens-semimiraculously-that that
which has survived to become "authoritative" actually possesses literary
or artistic value, which is defined by criteria independent of that which
has survived. Similarly, Posner might insist that our authoritative moral
conventions just so happen to be right as well as conventional, that the
authoritative meanings we employ have hit upon the truth, that the political institutions we inherit are wise, that our laws are just, and that the
values of civilization are good ones, where truth, wisdom, the good, and
the just all are independently defined. The history of the world could
have been otherwise, but, by strokes of miracle, or the cumulative effects
of particular acts of bravery, genius, and wisdom, it is not. Our history
fortunately has bequeathed us near-perfect normative authority in all
spheres of life. Under this "standard" sort of CLS critique, Posner celebrates authority because he views that authority through rose-colored
glasses.
A few parts of Law and Literature do rely on overtly sentimental or
quasi-sentimental arguments. 8 1 What is most striking about this book,
however, is that Posner largely does not sentimentalize either legal authority or the other forms of authority that he celebrates. At no point
does he argue, for example, that literary "classics" actually have literary
77 Id. at 91-99.

78 Id. at 240-47.
79 Id. at 67-70.

80 Id. at 74-75, 137-65.
81 Id. at 93-113. Particularly notable, in this regard, is Posner's treatment of Merchant of
Venice.
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or aesthetic value which can be independently defined. In fact, he argues
the inverse: that "aesthetic value" should be defined by the literary
works that survive to become classics. Similarly, Posner neither argues
for the "rightness" of our moral conventions nor sentimentalizes political
authority. The mandates of our "civilization," Posner teaches, should be
obeyed because they are civilized-because they reflect as well as constitute the Apollonian value of order-not because our particular civilization possesses some virtue which renders it worthy of respect.
Most importantly, Posner does not sentimentalize law. 82 Indeed, it
is important to emphasize that Posner is aggressively unsentimental
about law and legal authority. Posner insists throughout Law and Literature not only that a line should be drawn between law and politics (a
familiar claim), but that an even more absolute line must be maintained
between law andjustice.83 Law has no necessary connection with justice.
Legalism-that "bastion of Apollonian values"-is necessary, unchanging and generally desirable, regardlessof whether or not its laws arejust.
This insistence on a firm distinction between law and justice leads Posner
to one of the most profoundly troubling claims in this book: that "lawyer's law" is utterly devoid of moral content. There is no necessary connection between "lawyer's law" and justice. Lawyers do not know any
more about the nature of justice than any of the rest of us-nor should
they. Legal education inculcates neither understanding of nor respect for
justice, nor should it. Justice is not the subject, target, or ideal of law.
Although law "touches on" deep issues regarding the nature of justice,
"lawyer's law"-the stuff learned in law school-Posner tells us, has no
more to do with justice than it has to do with any other set of moral or
political ideals. 84 Legal education, law schools, and the legal profession
are not directed toward the creation of a just society, nor should they be;
instead, they are directed toward the creation of an orderly one. The aim
of law, Posner explains, is to mediate, not aggravate, conflict.8 5 Its goal
is order, not justice. Law, the Rule of Law, legalism, and laws are desirable solely because they order nature, not because their mandates are
just. 86 Law's value has no necessary or even incidental connection to the
justice of the world it authoritatively dictates. Indeed, law's value has no
connection to8 7any virtue. Law is good because and only because it is
authoritative.
Rather than sentimentalize authority, Posner supports his celebration of authority with what might be called a "Calvinist" or Darwinian
world-view, which suggests that human, contingent, pregiven authority
82 Id. at 76-79.
83 Id.
84 Id.

85 Id. at 79.
86 Id. at 25-70.
87 Id. at 27-33, 56-67.
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itself is the ultimate good, regardless of its content, justice, or morality.
Appropriately enough, Posner's description of the world begins with a
narrative account of life in the prelegal Hobbesian state of nature. In his
natural, prelegal habitat, Posner argues, man was a vengeful and irrational animal who inhabited a world of perpetual and vicious bloodletting. 88 Although efficiency was the teleological and sociological goal in
this state of nature, revenge, rather than the rule of law, was the method
by which efficiency was achieved; anger, rather than reason, was the
emotion by which the spirit of revenge was sustained. 89 Revenge, however, turned out to be a grossly inefficient mechanism for achieving either
collective or individual goals. Retribution is just too violent, and violence is just too costly. Thus, against this unstable backdrop, the Rule of
Law, as well as other forms of authority, made their appearance. The
Rule of Law constituted an all-around gain. Vengeance was channeled
into legal recourse, reason replaced anger as the means by which order
was achieved, and life became somewhat longer, a little less brutish, and
considerably more efficient. The Rule of Law turned out to be everything the Rule of Vengeance was not: efficient, rational, nonviolent,
unemotional, and cheap. 90 When contrasted with the vengeance and
bloodletting that were unleashed in the state of nature, the rule of law
was and has remained a godsend.
Posner next gives a parallel description of our modern-day internal
nature. Like the natural world that preceded civilization and the external natural universe with which we must still contend, our modern internal nature, even post-Rule of Law, continues to be irrational,
unintelligible, impenetrable, and malignant. Man is, by nature,
"fallen." 9' He is inevitably inclined toward evil. Indeed, that our inner
life is chaotic, irrational, evil, and unknowable and that it thus contrasts
sharply with our objective, rational, knowable, external behavior surely
constitutes the major descriptive claim of this book. The individual, Posner tells us again and again, is born into a chaotic, utterly senseless,
cruel, and essentially unknowable natural universe, and brings with him
into the world an equally instinctual, irrational, essentially unknowable,
and irreducibly evil, inner affective world.92 Neither the natural universe
nor man's internal affective life, Posner tells us, are susceptible to man's
understanding and control. 93 Thus, even in a modern society governed
by the Rule of Law, our inner, affective lives, like the hostile natural
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Posner's defense of the Rule of Law reaches its peak in ch. 3, The LiteraryIndictmentof Legal
Injustice. Id. at 132-75.
91 Id. at 164.
92 See generally the indictment of natural man, id. at 137-55, and the description of nature, id. at
25-70.
93 This underlies Posner's dislike of Nietzsche. See id. at 145-55.
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universe around us, are irrational, unknowable, and implacably evil. 94
Now, although Posner does not make the connection himself, the
perfectly sensible response to this horrific state of internal and external
nature is to seek out the clarity of institutional, cultural, and hierarchical
authority. Once a human command-authority-becomes part of the
cultural, institutional, and hierarchical world, it is no longer part of the
chaotic inner nature of any particular human being or group of human
beings from which it originated. When internal desires become external,
authoritative commands, they become conducive to order and thus are
rational. Institutional and hierarchical authority, in other words, is
everything that both inner and external nature are not. Authority is objective rather than subjective, reasonable rather than emotive, rational
rather than irrational, cultural rather than natural, and created rather
than given. It "rationalizes" the natural world because it literally and
figuratively "orders" it. It makes communal life predictable and civilized
rather than arbitrary and natural. It makes the world knowable, clear,
and certain. It dictates results. Whatever else it is, and regardlessof the
worth of the social world it either presupposes or promotes, institutional
authority that has persevered over time constitutes a relief from the
chaos of inner and external nature. Thus, obedience to contingent authority is more comfortable and comforting than survival in the natural
universe. If, like Posner, the liberal legalist believes or experiences his
internal nature to be dangerous, unknowable, and evil, then it is not surprising that virtually every form of manmade, culturally contingent
authority is tremendously appealing and that obedience to it is a tremendously comforting way of life.
The theory of value implicit in Posner's celebration of legal authority is perfectly suited to precisely this comforting, accommodating,
psychic response to the chaotic evil of internal and external nature. That
theory is startling, even alarming, in its simplicity: whatever of human
creation manages to survive across time gains authority, and whatever
has such authority shapes our lives and determines our values. In the
entire range of social, political, aesthetic, militaristic, and legal contexts
canvassed above, that which survives across time has "authority." The
directives that bind us are those that are provided by history. The happy
consequence of this authoritarian theory of value is that we need not rely
on our own dangerous, vengeful, instinctual, inner life to form our values. Authority, provided by history's victors, directs our conduct and
shapes our values. We are powerless to change this fact, but there is no
reason we should want to do so. That which has survived across time to
become "authoritative" is, for that reason, more trustworthy than we. In
contrast to the horrific state of nature, that which has been created across
time-that which history gives us-is good. Unlike the natural realm,
94 Id. at 176-208.
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institutional authority is not contaminated by our incomprehensible and
incomprehensibly evil natural inclinations and instincts. Historical and
cultural "authority" is therefore always good, where "authority" is simply whatever person, institution, or value which has had the strength to
dominate. Far from constituting illegitimate infringements upon some
utopian (or constitutional) ideal of equality, the powerful amongst us are
our moral, political, legal, aesthetic, and linguistic teachers. They are
our authorities.
Authority, in Posner's world, is always good, not because authority
is generally just or generally benign, but simply because it imposes order
on an irrational nature. Authority is rational, coherent, and knowable.
In fact, of all worldly phenomena, only authority is rational and coherent.
In contrast to the external natural world, and in stark contrast to the
inner world, authority of all sorts, including the social, religious, and
institutional forms in which it manifests itself, is rational, efficient, stable,
knowable, relatively unchanging, and dependable. While our internal
life, like the natural universe, is irrational, chaotic, and evil, external authority is perfectly rational, objectively intelligible, generally knowable,
and entirely coherent.
Before moving on to Posner's readings of literature, let me briefly
restate my original question and the answer I want to suggest. What, if
anything, motivates the liberal legalist's insistence that contingent, historical, legal authority is convergent with morality, justice, and value? If
Posner's latest book is at all representative-and I suspect it is-then the
liberal legalist's insistent and distinctive Panglossian faith that legal authority is necessary and good may have its roots not in a sentimental
tendency to see authority through rose-colored glasses but in a Calvinist
insistence that contingent authority should dictate not only our actions,
but also our moral ideals, legal norms, linguistic meanings, aesthetic values, and, ultimately, our individual moral worth. Empowered, pregiven
institutions of legal, economic, military, political, social, and cultural authority-like the Calvinist's empowered, pregiven, authoritarian Godthus dictate authoritative judgments about our moral worth while, at the
same time, they authoritatively determine our place in life. They mandate the justice of their judgments as they judge. They demarcate the
value of their demarcations as they demarcate. The authoritative institutions of our past-markets, laws, language, conventions, and politicsdictate, albeit arbitrarily, not only who we shall be, but also that we
ought to be what they dictate we shall be. The liberal legalist believes
that these authorities are good. A sentimental inclination to see our authorities as morally better than they in fact are may play little, if any,
role in the liberal's belief that pregiven, historical, contingent, institutional human authorities are good. Instead, the liberal legalist simply
may believe that the constriction of individual will to external mandate-
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obedience to authority, resignation to its necessity, and a disciplined response to its requirements-constitutes a good way of life.
Finally, that need-the need to restrict the individual will-may, in
turn, be rooted in a fear of the alternatives to obedience and discipline:
on the one hand, existential, linguistic and cultural freedom; on the
other, nature and subjectivity. If we can trust Posner's account, then it
seems fair to say that the liberal legalist is inclined to celebrate authority
at a very deep level of being. The liberal legalist wants external necessity
(whether law, economic markets, or God) to dictate his ideals just as its
commands most assuredly dictate his fate. The liberal legalist eschews
participationin the creation of the authoritative sources of value that determine his ideas and judge his moral worth. He is not to participate in
the creation of the meanings of words, the determination of aesthetic
value, the definition of moral right and wrong, or the institutions of legal
authority. It is not for him to decide what to value and why. Rather, the
authorities that make and judge him must exist entirely outside of him;
he has no control over the substance of the norms and commands which
dictate his values. The legalistic individual gives himself to the dictatorial control of authority because the alternative is abandonment to a chaotic, unpredictable, and evil state of internal and external nature. The
liberal legalist gives away his freedom to human authority because the
alternative is evil, chaotic, vengeful, unpredictable, and malignant. He
willfully gives away his freedom because he does not trust himself.
II.

INTERPRETIVE CONSTRUCTS

Posner's two major interpretive constructs-his celebratory view of
authority on the one hand, and his Calvinistic fear of nature on the
other-heavily predetermine his interpretations of great literature and
his understanding of critical literary theory. In Posner's view, most great
literature concerns the virtue of authority, the futility of politics, or our
evil human nature as revealed through the private process of individual
maturation. More pointedly, great literature--whatever its purported
subject-is almost always truly about the private attainment of the wisdom of age: that human nature is evil, random, and unknowable, that
authority is generally both good and necessary, and that subordinates
ought resign themselves to the "givenness" of society and the limits of
their capacity to change it. The message of serious literature, when it is
good, Posner teaches, is like the message of life itself: given authority is
necessary and eternal, human nature is irrational, and a life spent trying
to improve our nature or challenge authority is either a failed life (in
which case it is simply hopelessly misguided), a pathetic and ultimately
embittered life (such as, he suggests offhandedly, the life of the legal aid
lawyer or public defender), or a dangerous life as its false hopes threaten
civilization itself.
Posner's love of authority, particularly hierarchical authority, and
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his fear of nature are nowhere so clearly revealed as in his striking reading of Billy Budd, Sailor.95 In Billy Budd, the protagonist Captain Vere
executes the morally innocent Billy Budd, whose illegal action-striking
a superior officer-appears to the reader as entirely excusable and arguably justified. Unsurprisingly, Posner's interpretation of Billy Budd exonerates Captain Vere, the commander, of all legal and moral wrongdoing.
In Posner's view, Vere's execution of Budd, rather than Budd's act, is
what is justified. Vere suppressed his sentimental inclination toward
mercy to do what he justifiably and legitimately had to do as commander
of a naval ship threatened by mutiny-execute the morally innocent Billy
Budd. 96 This exoneration alone is not unusual. Exonerations of Vere are
fairly standard in the critical literature on Billy Budd.97 What is peculiar
about Posner's reading of Billy Budd is not that Posner forgives Vere, but
that he venerates him. Posner finds absolutely no illegality, injustice, or
moral wrong in Vere's execution of Budd despite not only legalistic errors in Vere's arguments, which Richard Weisberg has documented, 98
but also the glaring injustice inherent in Vere's multiple service in Billy's
case as commander, judge, witness, prosecutor, juror, and defense counsel. 99 Posner sees no glimmer of insanity, delusion, envy, sadism, or resentment in Vere's inner character despite Melville's meticulous
description of Vere to the contrary and the narrator's repeated urgings
that the reader should question Vere's motives and his mental stability.
Posner sees no manipulation of the objective legal text for personal, subjective, or vindictive ends in Vere's interpretation and application of the
Articles of War. Instead, Posner sees in Vere only a man worthy of
praise. His Vere is not just forgivable; he is exemplary. Vere embodies a
mature sense of duty and Rule of Law Apollonian virtues. 100 Vere did
his duty. He was a noble authority who squelched private feelings of
sentiment and mercy to fulfill his public duty. 101 He admirably bore the
responsibilities of command and performed the obligations imposed upon
him by law.
Posner, more bluntly, accepts Vere's own account of his obligations
hook, line, and sinker. According to Posner as well as Vere, Vere, the
powerful commander, is innocent of moral wrong; his obligation was to
obey the law, which he did unflinchingly and fairly. According to Posner
and Vere, then, Vere ought to be admired for his strength of character
for doing so. Posner sees no reason to question this. In Posner's reading,
Vere is simply a one-dimensional authoritarian hero. The "givenness" of
95 Id. at 155-66.
96 See WEISBERG, supra note 2.

97 See, e.g., Reich, The Tragedy of Justice in Billy Budd, 56 YALE REV. 368 (1967).
98 See WEISBERG, supra note 2, at 154.
99 R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 155-65.
100 Id. at 160-65.
101 Id.
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Vere's personal power and authority constitutes a sufficient condition for
the morality and necessity of his dominion over Billy's fate. Vere is heroic because he is authoritative, and authoritative because heroic.
The need to exonerate, vindicate, celebrate, and glorify Vere's authority, like Vere's execution of Billy itself, is predetermined by Posner's
and Vere's insistence on our necessarily malignant natural internality,
and, hence, by a fear of Billy's nature. Posner sees in Billy's prelegal and
childishly innocent spontaneous nature not a refreshing counterpoint to
Vere's pedantic and "bookish" legalism, but a nature dangerously prone
to the illegal act of homicide. Like Vere, Posner is quick to see in Billy's
naturalism and spontaneous subjectivity the danger of mutinous, murderous, and unconstrained chaos. Like Vere, Posner too quickly con10 2
cludes that the spontaneous and morally pure Budd is legally guilty;
and, like Vere, Posner accepts with almost no scrutiny the legal and military necessity of Billy's execution. Posner's own fear of mutiny, distaste
of romanticism, contempt for youth, and distrust of nature blinds him to
the possible illegality in Billy's execution and to the disingenuousness of
Vere's explanation to both himself and his officers of its necessity. Thus,
while Posner is surely driven to his overidentification with Vere through
his insistence on the morality of authority and law, the underlying reason
for that compulsion is that Posner views Budd's naturalness through the
same prism as did Vere. Where other readers see in Billy a sharp and
refreshing natural counterpoint to Vere's pedantic and cultured bookish
ethics, Posner, like Vere, sees in Budd's spontaneous, natural, nonverbal
subjectivity the danger of mutiny and the villainous, vengeful, and murderous instincts of the unconstrained natural man.
The consequence is that the conventional reading of Billy Budd,
Sailor is literally stood on its head. Billy Budd becomes not a tract
against the abuses of legalism, as it has been conventionally understood,
but an aggressive justification of a rigid, militaristic, and decidedly unjust
Rule of Law. Billy Budd becomes a warning to those charged with authority to resist the temptations of their dangerous, childish, and womanly inclinations toward mercy, equity, sentiment, and leniency. In a
society in which natural subjectivity threatens to erupt into public mutiny, and internal awareness could at any moment have become external
chaos, Vere stands firm for the Apollonian values of rigidity, rule, and
control. All of this, Posner implies, is what Melville himself intended. 103
Turning conventional biography as well as critical understanding on its
head, Melville, Posner tells us, understood the necessity of law in a fallen
world rife with the consequences of human fallibility. That law is necessary and necessarily desirable in a world riddled with the irremediably
102 Id. at 156.
103 Id. at 164.
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evil instincts of natural subjectivity, Posner concludes, is the sobering,
bitter, and cold lesson to be learned from Billy Budd, Sailor.
Three more examples demonstrate the various ways that the fear of
the unpredictability, irrationality, and malignancy of the natural realm
drives Posner's literary interpretations. First, fear of nature explicitly
governs Posner's substantive interpretations of a group of classics he calls
collectively, "revenge literature." Thus, in the first chapter of his book,
Posner argues that The Iliad, The Oresteia, Hamlet, Michael Kolhaus,
and its modernist adaptation, Doctorow's Ragtime, collectively stand for
the proposition that civil life under the Rule of Law is much better than
natural life under the Rule of Vengeance. 104 They are all literary briefs
for the Rule of Law. Hamlet, for example, is a brief against sovereign
immunity. If Hamlet had only had recourse to legal process, Posner suggests, he would not have had to seek violent revenge against his uncle.
Much of the resulting bloodletting thus could have been prevented. 10 5
All of these works unerringly demonstrate that the bloodletting that follows from the unleashing of human emotion which accompanies the absence of law and authority is not worth the spontaneity of action it
permits.
Second, the irrationality, malignancy, and impenetrability of nature
and of inner life almost inevitably turn out to be the "real" referent of
most of the decidedly nonbenign and irrational depictions of law that
unquestionably appear in great literature. Law, of course, is never itself
irrational or malignant. But it is often depicted in literature as profoundly irrational and malignant. This fact needs explaining. The reason for it, Posner explains, is not that so many authors mistakenly think
law to be what it is not. In fact, we are reassured that Shakespeare, Melville, and Kafka, all of whom depict law in a less than flattering light, led
respectable, lawful, and thoroughly bourgeois lives. 10 6 The reason these
authors represent law as malignant (even though it is not so) is because
they use law as a metaphor for that which is truly irrational and malignant: inner life. 10 7 Furthermore, the reason law works as a metaphor for
the profoundly irrational internal life, in spite of law's own irrationality,
is that it often mistakenly appears to the lay person to be irrational. For
example, Posner explains, a statute of limitations may appear to the lay
person to be an irrational constraint on someone's rights in cases in
which the underlying purposes of the statute are manifestly not being
served. 108 Although the lay belief that the statute is therefore irrational
is understandable, it nevertheless is mistaken. The certainty of statutes
of limitations serves the entirely rational and defensible end of order.
104 Id. at
105 Id. at
106 Id. at
107 Id. at
108 Id. at

25-70.
54-71.
98 (Shakespeare), 135 (Melville), 179 (Kafka).
81, 85, 90, 115-25, 179-86, 196-201.
77.
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Thus, though mistaken, the lay perception that the law is irrational and
sometimes oppressive serves the literary artist's needs. Because of its
apparent irrationality, law becomes the perfect metaphor for what the
literary artist is always at pains to describe: the irrationality, malignancy, and incoherence of our inner souls.
The irrationality of our inner life also turns out to be, for Posner, the
referent for the apparently irrational legal punishments depicted in great
literature.109 Lawfully mandated punishments, like statutes of limitations, are generally rational, even when they appear to be otherwise.
Therefore, when a literary work depicts an irrational punishment, that
punishment ought be read as a metaphor for internal irrationality, not a
description of external reality. This is particularly true of Posner's understanding of depictions of submissive and masochistic citizen consent
to the malignant and irrational punitive authority that pervades Kafka's
parables about law. 110 Each such embodiment of punitive authority and
each corresponding act of submissive consent, he argues, is not "about"
the external world in any significant sense at all. Instead, it always is
about some utterly private, internal, and most frequently Freudian obsession. For example, Posner insists that Kafka's The Penal Colony,"'where a military officer first tortures a prisoner, and then kills himself on
a torture machine of his own design which "writes" the crime in the
body of the accused, writing in his own body the sin of injustice-is not
really about punishment, justice, or sadism, as it certainly appears to be.
Plot notwithstanding, the story is not about anything so banal as the
morality or motivation of punitive authority. Rather, Posner argues, the
2 The
story is a metaphor for the impenetrability of our subjective lives. 11
Penal Colony is about the officer's inability, which is shared by many
ambitious, inventive people, to get his visitor to share his passion for the
engineered intricacies and technological complexities of his torture
machine. Like many other depictions of irrational, malignant authority,
The PenalColony, in Posner's hands, turns out to be about nothing more
than the "human inability to get others to share in our plans and
passions." 13
Third, the contrast between the rationality of our external and authoritatively controlled behavior and the swirling, chaotic, internal irrationality that motivates it is sharply revealed in Posner's understanding
of both law and contract. His discussion of the agreement in Merchantof
Venice between Shylock and Antonio in which Antonio pledges a
"pound of flesh" as security for a loan of money illuminates the con109
110
111
112

Id. at 35-36, 106, 124-25, 185.
Id. at 196-201.
Id.at 115-18.
Id.

113 Id. at 118.
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trast.1 4 Posner acknowledges and even insists upon the irrationality of
both of the contractors' inner lives. Antonio is driven by vaguely suicidal
as well as altruistic urges, and Shylock's internal soul is marred by sadism and a thirst for vengeance. Still, Posner fails to condemn the contract itself-the external behavioral manifestation of these characters'
internal lives-as irrational. Rather, Posner argues, the "spirit of the
Bond," when charitably read, is that it is a wealth-maximizing attempt to
insure repayment of a loan.' 5 Thus, the contract is rational, despite the
vividly irrational inner lives of both contractors. Our external contractual choices-indeed, our entire external legal lives-are invariably rational although our inner selves are in utter chaos.
Posner's commitment to a stark contrast between the irrationality,
impenetrability, and malignancy of our inner lives and the rationality,
objectivity, and coherence of our external behavior is evident not only in
his interpretations of literature, but also in his readings of historical fact.
Historical figures such as Shakespeare and Kafka, as well as fictional
characters such as Antonio and Shylock, Posner explains, had chaotic,
emotional, impenetrable, and indescribable inner lives even though their
external behavior was thoroughly rational and bourgeois. 116 At some
points, he carries this contrast to comical extremes. For example, much
of our objectively great artistic writing, Posner explains, occurs in a kind
of mechanical whirling-dervish, internal, subjective state. The inner process of a great writer is so unknown, impenetrable, irrational, and emotional-i.e., such a mystery-that the writer himself often has no
conscious memory of the process of writing. 117
The need to exonerate, venerate, and celebrate legal authority also
leads Posner to erroneous and even absurd readings of legal critics who
rely on literature and literary theory. To mention just a few examples,
Posner misreads Richard Weisberg's critique of legalistic resentment and
his supporting interpretation of Camus' The Stranger as a celebration of
murder,"I 8 misreads my critique of the ethical relativism that underlies
some forms of liberal legalism and my supporting interpretation of
Pudd'nhead Wilson as an attack on legal education,1 9 and misreads
Terry Eagleton's critique of formalism and supporting interpretation 120of
Merchant of Venice as a misguided attack on Venetian contract law.
Finally, although Posner explicitly disavows a moralistic approach
to literature, Posner's fear of nature and commitment to the virtue of
authority skews his evaluations as well as his interpretations of literature.
114 Id. at 93-96.
115 Id. at 97.
116 Id. at 98.
117 Id. at 231-32.
118 Id. at 151-55.
119 Id. at 85-86.

120 Id. at 105-07.
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When literature is good, he suggests, it teaches the lessons of maturity.
Dostoevsky's work, for example, is great because it preaches the wisdom
of religious resignation as a response to the perceived evils of the
world. '21 Correlatively, when literature questions the wisdom of individual resignation, obedience, and discipline and seems to suggest the viability of politics as a mode of life-as does, for example, some of Camus'
work-then it simply is not very good.12 2 Posner's bottom interpretive
line is straightforward. Authority is celebrated in great literature even
when it appears not to be (Shakespeare and Melville); when it is depicted
as malignant, it is a metaphor for something truly malignant, such as
inner life (Kafka); and, lastly, if authority is inescapably the author's target, then the literary work itself just is not any good (Camus). Those
who would suggest otherwise are wrong or worse.
III.

THE MORALITY OF AUTHORITY:

ONE CRITIQUE

There is obviously much that could be said about the celebration of
authority put forward in this book, and there is even more that could be
said about Posner's use of literature to stage it. First, let me register a
minor and self-interested complaint. Posner's use of literature to mount
his celebration of authority is hypocritical. One of the oft-stated, if minor, themes in this book is that literature ought not be sullied through
use and abuse in political debate.' 2 3 Literature, according to Posner, like
law itself, is and ought remain apolitical and its use in political debate is
entirely reprehensible. Great writers, Posner tells us repeatedly, always
have "other fish to fry"' 24 than the merely political. Indeed, the misperception common to legal critics that literature which purports to be
about law is sometimes truly about law constitutes the "misunderstood
relationship" referred to in the title. But, surely, Posner's own interpretive and evaluative claims that great literature asserts the futility of collective political action, the superiority of Apollonian values, the rightness
of given authority, and the superiority of law over natural vengeance are
themselves political claims. In the end, it is simply irritating to see Posner so aggressively doing what he relentlessly scolds others for doing:
using literature to make political arguments and reading literature
through a political lens.
For example (and this is the only time I'll mention it), the interpretive claim that Posner first made in his answer to my article on Kafka
and now expands upon in this work-the claim that Kafka's multiple
depictions of law as irrational or malignant are not really about law because law is rational and benign, but are about something else which
121 Id. at 169.
122 Id. at 86-90, 98-99, 169.
123 See, e.g., id. at 15-17, 356-57.
124 Id. at 355.
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truly is irrational and malignant-namely, inner life125-may be transparently predetermined by Posner's motivating view of law, but it nevertheless is a coherent claim about a particular author, built upon a
consistent if uninspired theory about the nature of law and literature.
Literature which depicts irrational law, on this view, must be read as
being about something of far greater interest-such as internal irrationality and malignancy-than merely law. When that claim, however, is
then coupled with the claim that works of literature nominally descriptive of the irrational, malignant life of the powerful in nonlegal contexts
(such as Hamlet) are disguised arguments for the Rule of Law, 126 the
first claim that great literature is never about a subject so banal as law
looks suspect, to say the least.
This inconsistency is ultimately no more than irritating, however,
simply because Posner doesn't take his own admonitions all that much to
heart. Posner is clearly more comfortable participating in this new interdisciplinary movement than in trashing its fundamental premise. Of far
greater import than Posner's inconsistent claims about the "misunderstood relationship" between law and great literature is the motivating
vision that drives both his literary and legal analyses. That motivating
vision is more than simply irritating. It is both wrong and profoundly
disturbing. For surely, in none of the spheres with which Posner is concerned-institutional, aesthetic, cognitive, moral, or legal-should the
powerful forces which have survived across time to become dominant,
and thus "authoritative," be permitted to define that which we choose to
value. The authorities in our world indeed are forces to be reckoned
with. They most assuredly have power. But they do not ipso facto define the good. Might really does not make right. Moreover, in none of
the spheres of life with which Posner is concerned is resignation, discipline, and obedience to authority-whether the authority be one's elders,
the ruling conventions of one's community, a word, a chain of command,
or a legal text-a morally acceptable way to live one's life.
Let me address each of the spheres of authority I've identified above
separately, for they each give rise to slightly different sorts of problems.
First, there are at least two problems with Posner's sobering and parental
political claim that, unpleasant as it may seem to the idealistic young,
our given institutional world of authority is the best and only of all possible worlds, and that what we ought to do, as we mature, is learn to obey
its mandates and accept its flaws. Not only is this "unpleasant truth" not
true, but it also is not at all unpleasant. It is a pleasant fiction, not an
unpleasant truth. For too many of the relatively privileged, it is not at all
unpleasant to learn that there is little or nothing one can do to make a
better world. Such a lesson may be unpleasant to the truly powerless;
125
126

Id. at 176-87.
Id. at 54-62.
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but, for the powerful and the privileged, it is a welcome release from
responsibility for the consequences of one's actions and inactions. Posner's "unpleasant truth" about how we cannot really do much of anything to change a more or less perfect social world is a paralyzing and
false excuse for inaction for those for whom it just is not so.
Although I have no "proof" (and could have no proof), I believe
that Posner's corollary phenomenological claim that "young people" inhabit a fool's paradise in which they falsely believe they can change the
world because they have not faced up to the "unpleasant truth that the
act is a slave to the limit" is also simply false. It may be true that young
people sometimes overrate their ability to create a perfect world. My.
sense, however, is that Posner's claim is almost entirely false for the
"young people" who are the most likely audience of Posner's book: law
students, young lawyers, and young legal academics coming of age in the
last quarter of this century. My sense (acquired anecdotally), is that law
students and young teachers and lawyers believe not in their own omnipotence, as Posner claims, but rather in their own impotence. Young lawyers at large firms, for example, notoriously describe themselves as
"slaves" with virtually no power; they rarely claim to believe they are
gods with endless influence. The young person who thinks he is a slave
but is not-who thinks his power is more limited than it is-is being
ruled by a pleasant falsehood, not an unpleasant truth. The young people that I encounter, teach, and work with in the law schools these days
are making themselves complacent (and to some degree, undoubtedly,
miserable) over a false sense of impotence, rather than making themselves giddy, as Posner seems to think, over a false sense of power.
Second, the people that Posner discusses in this work-both fictional characters and real historical individuals-are mostly lawyers,
judges, and legislators who have the very real legal or political power to
act other than as they do. Whether pleasant or unpleasant, the fact is
that these people have the power to change the world for the better, and
they are responsible for either their efforts to do so or their failure to try.
The reader of this book should pinch herself every twenty pages to remind herself, notwithstanding Posner's insistence on the necessity of authority and the futility of action, that lawyers, judges, and legislatorsnot to mention kings and princes of Denmark-are powerful people.
Posner's claim that the authority of civilization and its civilized values
are beyond reproach and that neither the subjects of the legal fiction Posner discusses nor the primary audience of this book-lawyers, judges,
and professors-has the power to change that civilization for the better is
simply absurd.
Third, Posner's aesthetic claim that literary value is a function of a
work's survival across time and that we ought respect the authority of
classics as we respect the authority of civilization, is equally indefensible.
Two implications, both troubling, follow from this peculiar argument
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that, if something survives, it is therefore good. The first is simply that,
in the aesthetic world as in the political, we are being asked to relinquish
our powers of choice and judgment, our very real and human capacity to
determine our own criteria of aesthetic value. That which survives, according to this argument, appropriately dictates our standards of value.
Aesthetics, like private life, becomes a sphere of life in which the obedient, constrained act is the good act and in which independent, reactive
aesthetic.judgment is as wicked as independent political action. The aesthetic good is equated with the strong; cultural might makes right. But
this is just wrong. There is no legitimate reason (outside the reasons
generated by the peculiar internal logic of the morality of obedience) to
believe that in art, any more than in life, that which survives some bizarre Darwinian fight is therefore that which is good.
Even more troubling is the implicit parallel ethical claim that the
criterion of moral right and wrong is to be found in the survival potential
of particular moral conventions. Again, such a claim is just not true. It
simply does not follow from the fact that a practice is widely held to be
morally reprehensible or morally acceptable that it is morally reprehensible or acceptable (unless, of course, we simply define right and wrong as
congruent with that which is widely believed). The conventionalist's
claim that shared conventions dictate moral truth simply shields us from
the responsibility for our own choices. When we abide by the conventions of our peers and our ancestors (or, more accurately, the conventions of those peers and ancestors who have proven sufficiently powerful
to achieve influence) because we feel them to be authoritative, rather
than because we have judged them to be right, we actively deny our freedom to do otherwise. We deny our freedom, our power, and our obligation to live truly moral lives when we do nothing but abide by the moral
conventions of our time and culture.
There is a further problem here. Moral conventionalism distances
us from self-understanding. We have the moral conventions we have
(e.g., prostitution is wrong, contracts for the sale of flesh are reprehensible, surrogacy contracts are immoral) for some reason. We deny ourselves the self-knowledge to be gleaned from a thorough appraisal of our
conventions when we view them as authoritative solely because they are
widely shared. This distancing from self-understanding has a very real
effect upon lawyering; for, without self-understanding of the grounds of
our conventions, we cannot possibly accomplish the fundamental lawyerly task of "reasoning by analogy" from that which is settled to that
which is novel. It is striking, for example, how few of us have settled
intuitions regarding surrogate parenthood even though we have entirely
settled cultural conventions over the propriety of contracting for the sale
of babies, the sale of body parts, or the use of a pound of flesh as collateral for a loan. The current debate engendered by the Baby M decision
vividly demonstrates the cost of denying self-understanding. When we
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blind ourselves to an understanding of the basis of our conventions so as
to maintain their authoritative control over our decisions, we have no
basis for deciding (or even discussing) less clear cases for which our conventions are not so settled.
Fourth, Posner's celebration of hierarchical authority as both necessary and necessarily desirable is also indefensible. The particular manner
in which personal authority within a hierarchy is exercised is sometimes
"necessary" and sometimes not. Captain Vere, for example, could have
decided Billy's case differently; consequently, Vere's claim (reiterated by
Posner) that the law, and not the man, executed the morally innocent
Billy is transparently unjustifiable. That personal authority in a hierarchy is held subject to higher authority does not necessarily exonerate it.
Hierarchical authority is neither more nor less moral than the person
who wields it, just as legal authority is neither more nor less just than
those who create and apply it. Even well-intentioned authority is susceptible to peculiar pathologies. In hierarchical life, as in family life, when
we wield authority over the fates of less powerful "others," we endanger
those futures with the remnants of our own psychic pasts. We ought be
held responsible for whatever damage we thereby do.
Fifth, if the Critical Legal Studies movement and the deconstructionist and indeterminacy critiques which that movement has elicited,
have taught us anything at all, they have shown that Posner's insistence
on the pregiven authority of the order imposed by the meanings of words
is linguistically indefensible. In the legal sphere, perhaps more than elsewhere, the authoritative textual interpreters who decide constitutional,
common law, and statutory cases-judges-are not constrained by either
the framers, precedent, or by the statutory text in anything like the way
Posner's repeated use of a military metaphor suggests, nor should they
be. The meaning of a legal command, like the meaning of any word, is,
of course, partly a function of the will of its originator. But it also is a
product of the will of its interpreter and the commitments of its interpreter's community. The extent to which meaning is a product of interpretation is a legitimate question for debate; in no event, however, is
meaning simply communicated, as Posner insists. The judge does not
simply obey a communicated "text" when she decides a case according to
law. Rather, judges quite overtly and quite properly choose a meaning
from a range of possible meanings. This range of meanings similarly is
not "given" from the past. It is a function of her community, her milieu,
her world view, her personal history, and the history she shares with her
community.
More generally, what emerges as one of Posner's central claims in
the latter part of his book-that a judge's moral legitimacy hinges on her
willingness to obey and that judicial morality is essentially a "morality of
obedience"-is just wrong. If judicial morality is, as Posner insists, essentially a morality of obedience to communicated textual authority,
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then judicial morality is in trouble. There simply are no pregiven meanings of legal texts. Judicial interpretation, like all interpretation, requires
either the interpretive constraints of the judge's community or active judicial choice. The meanings of all legal texts are products of the relationships of power that produce, hear, and interpret them. Every "law" and
"legal decision" is composed of words whose meanings are a function of
the choices of the powerful, whether those powerful be their drafters or
their interpreters. The judge does and should participate in the construction of legal meaning.
But the difficulties with Posner's militaristic image of the nature of
interpretation go well beyond the distinctiveness of the judicial sphere. It
is not only the meanings of the overtly imperative commands of constitutional framers which are not "given." Rather, the meanings of all of our
words and concepts-from the exalted and disembodied "moral principles" that Dworkin and Fiss insist constrain judicial choice to common
words and concepts of both legal and nonlegal discourse-are created,
not given, and contingent, not necessary. It is because they are created
that they are open to challenge, change, and choice. There is nothing
"given" about the linguistic meanings of even nonlegal words. Words
mean what they mean because of the hidden (or not so hidden) choices of
contingently powerful subgroups in our linguistic culture. The linguistic
and social bonds created by the "shared meanings" of our language, consequently, are either "communities" of choice or "hierarchies" of power.
Either way, just as the judge participates in the construction of the meaning of a precedent, we all participate in some fashion in the creation of
linguistic meanings to the extent of our power. The "order of things"
reflected in our words and their meanings is, to varying extents, chosen
by us, imposed upon us, or a combination of the two. Never is it simply
"given."
In a lovely preface to his book The Order of Things,127 Michel
Foucault captures the difficulty of analyzing the freedom we create when
we glimpse the order in things to which we are otherwise blind because
we have mistaken that order for the things themselves. That passage is
worth quoting:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that
shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thoughtour thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography-breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we
are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a "certain
Chinese encyclopedia" in which it is written that "animals are divided into:
(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e)
sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification,
127 M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1973).
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(i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (1)
et cetera, (m)having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way
off look like flies". [sic] In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we
apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of
our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.
But what is it impossible to think, and what kind of impossibility are
we faced with here? ...
The fundamental codes of a culture-those governing its language, its
schemes of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices-establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at
home. At the other extremity of thought, there are the scientific theories or
the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in general,
...and why this particular order has been established and not some other.
But between these two regions, so distant from one another, lies a domain
which... is... fundamental ....It is here that a culture, imperceptibly
deviating from the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary codes,
instituting an initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, relinquishes its immediate and invisible powers, frees itself sufficiently to discover that these orders are perhaps not the only
possible ones or the best ones; this culture then finds itself faced with the
stark fact that there exists, below the level of its spontaneous orders, things
that are in themselves capable of being ordered, that belong to a certain
unspoken order; the fact, in short, that order exists.... Thus, between the
already 'encoded' eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region
which liberates order itself: it is here that it appears, according to the culture and the age in question, continuous and graduated or discontinuous
and piecemeal, linked to space or constituted anew at each instant by the
driving force of time .... This middle region .... in so far as it makes
manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then
taken to be more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which
is why this experience of order in its pure primary state always plays a
critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, always more 'true'
than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture,
between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections
upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of
28
being. 1
One small piece of evidence for my claim that it is a "celebration of
authority," and not a sentimental inclination to see authority as better
than it is, which underlies liberal legalism generally, and not just Posner's version of it, is the relentlessly hysterical reaction of liberal legal
theorists to the essentially linguistic insights of the interpretive and her128 Id. at

xv-xxi.
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meneutic wing of the Critical Legal Studies movement. 129 Significantly,
but for its implicit embrace of Posner's "morality of obedience" and the
Darwinian theory of value on which it rests, traditional liberal legal theory, far more than literary theory, should have proven a distinctively
congenial and fertile field for deconstructionist and hermeneutic interpretive insights. More than other scholars, and certainly more than literary
scholars, legal academics should understand and even insist upon the
claim that propositional claims about the "nature of things" are, in fact,
semidisguised imperatives about the "order of things," about how things
shall be.
Some mainstream liberal legal theorists, of course, embraced the
central insights of hermeneutics, interpretivism, and critical theory far
before it was fashionable to do so. No less a "mainstream" scholar than
H.L.A. Hart has argued again and again that propositional claims about
the "nature of things" in the legal realm are disguised imperatives issued
by the powerful. Lawyers, perhaps more than other professionals,
should be sympathetic to the claim that, at least in the legal realm, behind claims to truth, order, and nature lie claims to power. Indeed, the
legal culture, more than any other, exists "between the use of what one
might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, [in which]
130
...there is the pure experience of order and of its modes of being."
The antipathy between liberal legalism and deconstructionism is not, at
root, theoretical. The liberal legalist understands and, indeed, does exactly what Foucault describes:
[he] emancipat[es himself] to some extent from ...[the culture's] linguistic,
perceptual, and practical grids, [and] ...superimpose[s] on them another
kind of grid which neutralize[s] them, which by this superimposition both
reveal[s] and exclude[s] them at the same time, so that the culture, by this
very process, [comes] face to face with order in its primary state. It is on
the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid. It is on the
basis of this order, taken as a firm foundation, that general theories as to the
ordering of things, 1and
the interpretation that such an ordering involves,
31
will be constructed.
There may be no better description of traditional legal and judicial reasoning than this.
If this is so, then why, in the last fifteen years, has the critical scholars' insistence on hermeneutic indeterminacy generated such hysteria
from liberal legal theorists? If nothing else, Posner's lengthy refutation
of the Critical Legal Studies movement lays utterly bare the emotional
basis of liberal legal antipathy to the critical scholars' tireless demonstra129 See, e.g., Carrington, Law and the River, 34 J. LEG. EDUc. 222 (1984); Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
130 M. FOUCAULT, supra note 127, at xxi.
131 Id. at xx-xxi.
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tions of legal indeterminacy. By insisting on the necessity of interpretive
choice, the critical scholar uniquely insists that the interpreter actively
participate, and not simply acquiesce, in the creation of meaning. According to the critical scholar, the interpreter, like the originator, participates in the creation of the "order of things" assumed by and constituted
by the text to a degree dependent upon the amount of power the interpreter wields; in no event, however, does the interpreter simply "apply" a
pregiven natural meaning. This central critical insight is threatening to
liberal legalism not because it challenges the epistemological commitments of liberal legalism-it does not-but because it challenges the liberal legalist's moral and existential commitment to authority and
obedience. If the critical scholar is right, there is simply no way that
obedience to the commands contained in the disembodied meanings of
pregiven "words" or "texts" is an even possible mode of life, much less a
good one. For those who have had, in Foucault's words, "the pure experience of order and of its modes of being," obedience to the commands of
others contained in the words we use is simply not a viable response to
the individual's existential situation. If Posner's book can be taken as
representative, then the critical theory movement is threatening to the
liberal legalist because by laying that truth bare, it robs him of the power
to deny freedom.
Finally, and for all of the reasons recited above, Posner's claim that
legal authority is both necessary and necessarily good and that a plan of
life that centers upon obedience to lawful authority is a plan of life worth
celebrating is plainly wrong. Legal authority is not necessary, stable, or
unchanging. There is simply no rationally defensible reason to think of
extant law as unchanging. Whether we view law as "relatively stable"
(as does Posner 132) or as in a state of "constant flux" depends entirely on
our vantage point. If we stand far enough removed, law may appear to
be relatively unchanging. From a closer perspective, however, it is just as
obviously the case that law continually is being changed and recreated.
There is nothing necessary about the particular legal institutions, legal
decisions, or legal concepts and legal vocabulary within which we construct our lives and constrain our choices. Our law is entirely contingent;
any and every part of it could most assuredly be and have been
otherwise.
Just as clearly, nothing is necessarily just, benign, or desirable about
our extant legal authority. Law reflects particular and changing political
choices, commitments, and visions which may or may not constitute a
desirable form of social life; it is communicated in words whose meanings
are a function of the choices-no matter how deeply embedded-of the
powerful members of particular interpretive communities which may or
may not impose a decent order upon the nature of things; it is applied
132 R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 74.

1007
HeinOnline -- 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1007 1988-1989

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

through the mandates, edicts, and commands of particular judges who
may be driven by wisdom, compassion, principle, sadism, or fetish; and it
is interpreted against the backdrop of a civilization which may or may
not be worth preserving. Whether law is good, bad, or generally worthy
of our respect is a pressing question that constantly demands an answer.
The lawful act is not necessarily the good act, and the legally obedient
life is not necessarily the good life. In law, as in other spheres of life,
authority is not necessarily just; obedience to authority qua authority is
not a morally defensible plan of life.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

A

FEMINIST ALTERNATIVE

Whether, as I have argued in this review, the celebration of authority endemic to liberal legalism is motivated by a Calvinist thirst for the
certainty, clarity, and possibility for judgment presented by external authority, or by a sentimental inclination to see our authorities as better
than they are, it nevertheless constitutes a profoundly misguided view of
our potential, nature, past, and future. For that alone it surely ought to
be resisted in law schools and elsewhere. No matter what motivates it,
the celebratory attitude toward authority manifested in liberal legal discourse-its overtly authoritarian denial of the possibility of existential
freedom, its nihilistic insistence on the futility of politics, its illiberal denigration of the false promise of youth and individuality, its militaristic
battle cry against the dangers of communitarian ethics, and its complacent insistence on the desirability of the authoritarian status quo in political, ethical, cultural, legal, and epistemological life--constitutes an
extraordinarily ugly delineation and limitation of our human potential.
Of course, that ugly denial of our freedom and our duty to recreate
our present world is hardly limited to the legalistic mind set. Nor is it
new. In fact, in a prescient passage, Bertrand Russell elaborates on Aristotle's similarly complacent, and similarly reactionary, ethics:
The views of Aristotle on ethics represent, in the main, the prevailing opinions of educated and experienced men of his day. They are not, like Plato's,
impregnated with mystical religion; nor do they countenance such unorthodox theories as are to be found in the Republic concerning property and the
family. Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent,
well-behaved citizens will find in the Ethics a systematic account of the
principles by which they hold that their conduct should be regulated.
Those who demand anything more will be disappointed. The book appeals
to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since
the
the seventeenth century, to repress the ardors and enthusiasms of 133
young. But to [one] with any depth of feeling it cannot but be repulsive.
For anyone with depth of feeling, Posner's denial of freedom, youth,
spontaneity, romanticism, affect, and nature, and his relentless insistence
on the virtues of authority and "prevailing opinion" in law and else133 B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 172-73 (1945).
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where, cannot but be repulsive. But our analysis obviously cannot stop
there. The liberal legalism premised on an attraction to authority is not
only "repulsive." Its implications are also demonstrably wrong. Our
civilization is not perfect, and our individual and collective powers to
change it are not so severely constricted as Posner insists. The critical
scholars are right to insist that meaning is contingent, and that we might,
can, and should use our language creatively to construct other, more true
and more loving meanings than those presently reflected in all of our
discourse, but particularly the legal. We ought not acquiesce to the limitations imposed by "the order of things." Moral skeptics as well as
moral realists are right to insist on the contingency of our moral conventions and to insist that we might, can, and should use whatever power we
have to question the "moral conventions" of our extant community.
Those of us actively participating in North American collective life in the
1990s-which includes everyone in the U.S. law school communityought not acquiesce in the presently stagnated moral conventions of our
own national community.
Similarly, modem literary critics are surely right to insist on the
contingency of aesthetic value and to insist that we might, can, and
should use whatever power we have to question and destabilize the sanctity of "classics." We ought not acquiesce in the definitive vision of aesthetic value bestowed by the survivors of some Darwinian struggle. The
CLS scholars are also surely correct in insisting on the contingency of
law, in insisting that lawyers, judges, and legal academics might, can, and
should use their legal power to create a more just and more loving community, and in insisting that as teachers we might, can, and should use
our pedagogic power to insure that our students will do just that. We
ought not acquiesce in a legal order that refuses to even articulate our
ideals, much less strives to achieve them. Such acquiescence in the "order of things" is neither necessary nor desirable.
Yet if my analysis of liberal legalism's motivations is right, the CLS
scholars' largely historical attack on liberal legalism's sentimentalism,
while important, will be heard by many liberal legalists as simply beside
the point. Of course, to whatever extent that liberal legalist complacency
is grounded in a falsely sentimental view of the necessity and desirability
of authority, a dose of critical history is surely the cure. We do indeed
need to understand and teach law as the product of contingent choices
made by particular people who could well have decided other than as
they did. Only then will we understand that we can improve upon those
decisions. However, to the extent that the liberal legalist's acquiescence
in the status quo is grounded, not in a sentimental misconception about
the virtue of extant law, but in a thirst for the certainty, clarity, and
restraint upon the will facilitated by institutional authority, and, to
whatever extent that thirst is itself rooted in a fear of nature, subjectivity,
spontaneity, and emotionalism, the CLS scholars' historical demonstra-
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tion that law is contingent and could well have been otherwise is simply
nonresponsive. If the liberal legalist's nightmare depiction of our existential and natural circumstance is correct, then any authoritative legal
choice, no matter what the social vision or lack of social vision it presupposes, is acceptable and ought to be respected. Any legal choice, after
all, imposes order; order, regardless of content, is better than the random
malignancy of our inner nature, which freedom and change continually
threaten to expose. That those choices could have been different, and
even could have been better, pales in significance when contrasted with
the horrific state from which every legal order necessarily delivers us.
Thus, while critical legal scholarship has proven a tremendously
powerful antidote to the sentimentality in liberal legal discourse, it has
not proven responsive to liberal legalism's less explicit but equally foundational authoritarianism. Critical legal scholarship, particularly critical
legal histories, offers a clear understanding of the historical contingency
of legalism and an important antithesis to liberal legalism's sentimental
view of the morality of extant power. It offers nothing, however, that
even remotely counters the fear of nature, subjectivity, spontaneity, and
freedom that is, at least in part, the emotional root of legal liberalism's
authoritarian embrace of order. I suspect that this is because the critics
do not yet well understand that fear, although it may be because they
share it. But to combat the ignorance and complacency of false sentimentalism, we need knowledge, particularly of our past. To combat the
fear that our malignant subjective nature will explode with every minuscule crack created by a change in the extant order, however, we need
hope-a hope that is both mindful of history and firmly grounded in social vision. Critical Legal Studies is long on explosive and debunking
histories. Its scholars have well shown the contingency and malignancy
of many of our legal orders. But they are notoriously short on hope.
I suspect that it will ultimately be feminism, feminist jurisprudence,
and feminist legal theory-not the Critical Legal Studies movementthat develops a vision and an account of law that is responsive to the
authoritarian dimension of liberal legalism. It is too early-way too
early-in the development of a feminist jurisprudence to say that feminism has already done so. Nevertheless, for several reasons I believe it is
more likely to do so than the Critical Legal Studies movement. First,
feminists share the CLS scholars' sensitivity to and criticism of liberal
legalism's sentimental strand. Feminists understand both the contingency of legal choice and its malignancy. Feminist jurisprudence, however, unlike the Critical Legal Studies movement, promises more; it is in
those promises, not yet fulfilled, that one can discern the beginning of a
response to liberal legalism's authoritarian side and to the fear of both
internal and external nature that is its affective root.
Most importantly, it is feminist jurisprudence (at least some
strands), not critical scholarship, that values, rather than fears, the
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beauty and necessity of both the external and internal natural order and
argues for a world-view that seeks harmony with nature rather than
dominance over it. Similarly, it is feminism, rather than critical scholarship, that values, rather than fears, subjectivity. It is feminism, rather
than critical scholarship, that self-consciously grounds our moral capacity in our affective, empathic, and emotional subjective life; it does not
regard that subjective affective life as something dangerous which must
be controlled by either moral principle or legal mandate.1 34 For all of
these reasons, I believe that feminism, rather than critical scholarship,
offers a truly expanded vision of what it means to be a human being, a
natural human being, a moral human being, and a social human being.
Thus, I see it as feminism, rather than critical scholarship, that is actively
and self-consciously laying the groundwork for a vision of law in society
that will be more loving, more natural, and more just than the Apollonian vision embraced by modern liberal legalism. It is feminism, and
perhaps only feminism, in the modern legal academic world that teaches
us to learn from our forgotten nature, to listen to our hearts, and to trust
our deepest selves, and to thereby reclaim our lost and alienated authority over our collective as well as individual fates.

134 For an excellent review of the relevant feminist literature, see Resnick, On the Bias, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1877 (1988).
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